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Summary: The aim of the paper is to analyze the problems of Russia´s integration into the world 
economy from the point of view of the theory of interjurisdictional competition. It argues, that huge 
exit-effects in the Russian economy do not lead to increasing quality of institutions and economic 
policies. In order to explain this situation, the paper focuses on the demand and supply sides of the 
market for institutions and public policies. Their behavior patterns contribute to the stabilization of 
the inefficient equilibrium. From the normative point of view, the result of the paper is that Russia´s 
integration into the world economy can succeed, only if the political institutions are transformed 




Zusammenfassung: Der vorliegende Beitrag versucht, die Probleme der Integration Russlands in 
die Weltwirtschaft aus Sicht des Jurisdiktionenwettbewerbs zu untersuchen. Es wird behauptet, dass 
die russische Wirtschaft durch hohe Exit-Effekte gekennzeichnet ist, die, allerdings, nicht zur 
Verbesserung der Qualität von Institutionen und Wirtschaftspolitik führen. Um diese Lage zu 
erklären, werden die Nachfrage- und Angebotsseite auf dem Markt für Institutionen und öffentliche 
Politik untersucht, deren Verhaltensmuster (u.A. zu einer Stabilisierung des ineffizienten 
Gleichgewichts führen. Aus normativer Sicht wird daraus abgeleitet, dass Integration in die 
Weltwirtschaft erst dann effizient sein kann, wenn die politischen Institutionen verändert werden 
und private Machtzentren abgeschwächt werden.   
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1.  Introduction 
Russia’s integration into the world economy has been one of the most important topics for political 
and scientific discussion in Russia and abroad during this decade. The system transformation of the 
Russian economy and politics determines important changes in Russia’s position in the global 
economic and political system. Of course, the Soviet Union was not a real autarky, closed economy, 
and even the socialist block remained part of the global economy. In fact, Wallerstein (2001) 
considered the USSR to be one of the core countries of the economic world system after World War 
II. However, the creation of market institutions means a new quality with respect to Russian 
integration into the world economy. First, more companies participate directly or indirectly in 
global competition. Second, the decisions of Russian actors in the world economy are met 
decentralized and by every enterprise. That’s why there is a broader spectrum of interests of 
different groups and individuals affecting Russia’s position in the world economy, not only that of 
the bureaucracy and politicians like in the Soviet Union. 
The objective of this paper is to analyze Russia’s integration into the world economy from the 
point of view of the theory of interjurisdictional competition. In Section 2, we provide a brief 
overview of the theory of interjurisdictional competition. Section 3 deals with the main effects of 
the interjurisdictional competition for the Russian economy, and in Section 4 we develop a set of 
possible explanations for the economic problems of Russia from the point of view of the 




2.  Theory of the Interjurisdictional Competition: A Brief Overview 
From an economic point of view, the relation between governmental structures and private actors 
can be described as a market. The government offers certain goods (including public goods, formal 
institutions enforced by the public authority, and even private goods like assets in the privatization 
process) to private actors, charging a fee in the form of taxes for its consumption. In a closed 
economy, the government is a natural monopoly.  
There are many governments in an open economy with free capital and labor movement 
between countries offering different packages of goods of different quality and price. That means 
that individuals and companies can chose the optimal variant, investing in that country (or settling 
in a country) which is most attractive for them. The companies chose an “exit” from the countries 
with lower quality or higher price of public and institutional goods. The tax base is reallocated to 
the countries with better institutions or lower taxes. Other countries suffer under negative economic 
processes.  
This means there are reasons for the government to try to attract mobile factors under different 
theoretical assumptions. A “benevolent dictator” is concerned with negative trends in the national 
economy. An egoistic “Leviathan” government loses the main income source for bureaucrats and 
politicians (in form of taxes and even in the form of bribes – there is no reason to bribe the 
government if a company does not plan on investing in the country). In the democratic regime, 
politicians can lose the elections. One more factor which can be important for the government is the 
declining influence in the international relations system. The governments also compete for mobile 
factors of production (capital and labor). As the mobility of capital in the modern world is higher 
than that of labor, governments compete for capital rather than for both production factors.  
This process is called interjurisdictional competition. The main instruments used by the state 
to attract mobile factors and to prevent “exit” are fiscal policy, especially taxation (fiscal   3 
competition; tax competition) and institutional policy (quality, ecological and social standards, 
competition law etc.) (institutional competition). 
The model of interjurisdictional competition is usually used to describe relations between 
subnational jurisdictions in a federative state like the US or Switzerland. The globalization process 
means a higher level of mobility of production factors through national borders. For this reason, the 
theory of the interjurisdictional competition can be used to describe relations between states in a 
world economy. Some studies provide empirical evidence for the existence of competition between 
OECD and EU states. Another point involves competition between mature market economies and 
developing countries (the problem of “ecological dumping” and “social dumping”). One more case 
for international interjurisdictional competition is the existence of offshore financial centers and tax 
heavens (the so-called “harmful tax competition”). 
The theory of interjurisdictional competition is another way to deal with competitiveness than 
that which was criticized by Krugmann (1994). This theory deals not with the competitiveness of 
the national economy, but the competitiveness of government (or, in broader sense, of immobile 
production factors). Interjurisdictional competition is not a zero-sum game. Even a weak 
competition position of a national government can induce changes in governmental policy enforced 
by competition forces that improve the quality of life of all citizens. 
Depending on theoretical assumptions, however, there are many different positions on economic 
and social effects of institutional competition. The basic neoclassical tax competition model 
describes the behavior of benevolent states using only tax competition to attract capital. The result 
is the so-called “race to the bottom,” taxation of mobile factors (capital) declines to the zero level. 
The result is either the underprovision of public goods or the tax shift to immobile factors like labor 
(Zodrow, Miesckovski 1986). Until now, there has been little empirical evidence for “race to the 
bottom” (see Krogstrup 2003 and Feld 2001) (An example of this process is the MERCOSUR 
(Baer, Cavalcanti, Silva 2003). Assuming, that governments use both taxation and production of 
public goods and institutions to attract capital and that companies are interested not only in the law 
“price” of public services but in their high “quality” as well, some scholars make the conclusion 
that interjurisdictional competition leads to a more efficient provision of public goods (the Tiebout 
hypothesis)1.  
Strong support for positive effects of interjurisdictional competition is based on the evolutionary 
economics and the public choice theory (Streit 1996). Competition between states (as well as 
competition between companies) has a control function and a discovery function. First, the states 
are not benevolent; the politicians and bureaucrats try to improve their wealth rather than support 
public needs. The failure of democratic procedures (like the paradox of voting and the influence of 
interest groups) and even the absence of democracy in an autocratic political regime prevents 
citizens from influencing governmental policy. “Exit” is an additional instrument of control. 
Second, competition can be described as a discovery process. Governmental policies are hypotheses 
about the possible needs of individuals. The competition process tests this hypothesis, selecting out 
the less efficient ones. 
But some arguments criticize the efficiency of the control and discovery function. There are 
market failures in interjurisdictional competition as well as in competition between private actors. 
For example, governments can create a type of “cartel,” harmonizing price and the quality of goods. 
The information asymmetry between private and public actors prevents them from meeting optimal 
decisions. The “competition order” (or the main institutions impacting the behavior of supply-side 
and demand-side agents) influences the effects of the interjurisdictional competition (Leipold 
1997a). 
 
                                                           
1   For an overview of interjurisdictional competition theories see: KENYON 1997; WILSON 1999; FELD 2001; KROGSTRUP 
2002; SCHENK 2002; JANEBA, SCHJELDERUP 2003   4
3.  “Exit” in the Russian Economy 
Russia’s integration into the world economy means an active participation in the interjurisdictional 
competition. The investment (divestment) decision patterns of Russian and foreign companies 
include the consideration of the “price” and the “quality” of the institutions and public gods. And 
even individuals (especially wealthy ones) can “exit” or “enter” Russia. 
To measure the effect of “exit” and “entrance” in the Russian economy, we use three indicators: 
•  capital flight. Despite strict capital controls, capital outflow continued during the 1990s (see 
Figure 1). Official statistics do not represent the illegal and “half-legal” channels of capital 
flight. Under expert opinion, capital flight can be even larger than is represented in Figure 
2. Both graphs (Figure 1 and 2) show a decline in capital outflow after 1998. In Q2 2003, 
net capital inflow amounting to $3.6 bln was registered. Because of the Yukos deal, this 
inflow was replaced by capital outflow (Q3 – $8.7 bln). 
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Fig. 1: Capital flight from Russia ($Billions, average expert assessment without extremely 
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Source: Lopashenko 2002, p.22-23 
 
•  The “brain drain”. The emigration of scientists and other high-qualified professionals 
remained an important problem for Russia over the last decade (see Figure 3). Figure 3 
shows that there is a decline in the number of scientist emigrants in 1997-1998 and in 2000-
2001. One possible explanation is the improvement of the situation in the scientific 
community. “Meanwhile, Russian science has managed to survive the most difficult years of 
economic crisis, and over the last two years, the situation in Russian science has gradually 
improved” (DEZHINA, GRAHAM 2002, p.14). A more pessimistic view explains the 
situation by a decline in the quality of Russian science.  
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•  The deficit of foreign investments. This indicator is the most contradictory one, because it is 
difficult (or may be impossible) to find out the necessary volume of foreign investments, 
because human wishes are unlimited. Some scholars believe that inward capital flow is 
sufficient to reequip the whole Russian industry. The degree of Russian integration into the 
world economy, however, is now higher than that of the USSR. There are new sectors of 
industry which also require investments. For this reason, it is useless to build up the whole 
industrial complex of the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the capital inflow within 
Russia was most certainly limited (see Figure 4). If we identify the “peer group” of 
competitors for the Russian government in global interjurisdictional competition, it is 
important to notice that there is no direct competition between Russia and OECD countries 
from the point of view of foreign investors (both transnational corporations with FDI and 
portfolio investors). Russia competes only with other emerging markets (Loukashov, Arinin, 
Kocheshkova, Isahanian 2003, p.4). Compared with other transformation countries, Russia’s 
inflow of FDI was relatively low (Figure 5). 
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2 For 2003 only a 9-month-result was available. The annual result is calculated as a 9-month result * 4/3   7 
















Source: Dabrowski, Gortat 2002, p.564  
 
Capital flight, brain drain and the deficit of foreign investments demonstrate an active use of “exit” 
by Russian actors (and the failure of “entrance” by foreign actors). To understand the reasons for 
this “exit,” we need to analyze the “supply side” represented by the Russian government from the 
point of view of price and quality. 
The “price” of goods offered by the Russian government is relatively low, especially under 
recent changes in tax policy (the reduction of the corporate profit tax and introduction of the “flat” 
income tax of 13%) (see Figure 6). 
   8

























































































































































































































Source: KPMG 2003, p.3-4 
 
But there is an additional problem regarding the price of public goods and institutions in Russia, 
the existence a huge number of additional (partly illegal) payments. On the basis of some 
measurements, for example, an entrepreneur pays about 10% of the deal’s value in the form of 
bribes to different government (federal, regional and municipal) officials (INDEM 2001). The 
resulting “price” is higher than the official one. 
But the most important problem remains a law quality of institutions and public goods. It is 
difficult to measure these factors. There are 5 criteria for assessing the quality of institutions 
described in the paper of Welfens (2003, p.3): 
•  Consistency of institutions. First, the problem of Russian law is the parallel existence of 
different partly contradictory norms. For example, there are important differences between 
the Civil Code as the basic act of civil law and special acts on insurance, acts on leasing etc. 
Moreover, there are even greater differences between acts of the Parliament and those of 
Ministries and other public agencies. Second, may be a more important case of 
inconsistency of Russian institutions is the difference between legal and unofficial 
institutions. A good example can be seen in the high degree of corruption. Russia ranks 86 
under the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2003 (Transparency 
International 2003, p.4) and 92 under the World Democracy Audit Corruption Ranking 
(World Democracy Audit 2003). Third, an inconsistency exists between the law (and even 
the informal institutions) and its application by powerful (private and public) agents. 
Sometimes public authority applies existing legal norms differently for different actors. The 
case of Yukos is one of the recent examples of this feature of the Russian institutional 
system3. 
•  Legitimacy of institutions. First, the differences between official and unofficial institutions 
reduce the legitimacy of both. Second, the deficit of democratic procedures reduces the 
legitimacy of the law. And third, the fragmentation of Russian society leads to a kind of 
“institutional interregnum” (see Brockmeier 1997). Even the informal institutions are used 
only by small groups of people. 
•  Reduction of the set of rules to the minimally efficient one. Russian law is a sophisticated 
system of different acts and regulations. However, the situation is not quite different from 
                                                           
3  The resulting deficit of confidence between economic agents is an important problem for the Russian economy as well as for some 
other transition economies (Leipold 1997, p.61). For empirical evidence of the deficit of confidence, see Oleinik 2001, p.137   9 
that in developed countries.  The complexity of Russian law is an additional feature making 
its inconsistency a more important problem. 
•  General rules rather than individual rules. The Soviet economy with its huge monopolies 
determined the importance of certain enterprises for the Russian economy. These companies 
are often regulated by other sets of rules than are their smaller competitors. For example, 
there are different terms for accounts submission set for Sberbank and other Russian banks. 
•  Completeness. A paradoxical feature of the Russian set of institutions is its combination 
between the complexity of existing rules and the deficit of necessary rules and institutions. 
For example, there is still a deficit of rules regarding the protection of shareholders’ rights 
(corporate governance). 
•  An often-used indicator for the quality of economic institutions is the index of economic 
freedom. The Heritage Foundation ranks Russia 114 (“mostly unfree”) based on 
characteristics like “law level of property rights protection,” the “high level of restrictions 
in banking & finance” and the “high level of regulations” (Heritage Foundation 2004, 
p.339-341). Under the Fraser Institute report “Economic Freedom of the World,” Russia 
ranks 112 of 132 countries (Fraser Institute 2003, p.12). 
We believe there to be an excellent criterion for the quality of private goods (i.e., the market and 
the competition as the discovery process). We can accordingly assert that the quality of institutions 




4.  Effects of the Interjurisdictional Competition for the Russian 
Economy 
To analyze the reasons for the inefficiency of interjurisdictional competition in Russia, we use the 
model of the “market for public goods and institutions” described in the Section 2. The economic 
performance of interjurisdictional competition in Russia depends on the behavior of main actors on 




4.1  Demand Side of the Market for Institutions and Public Goods 
A surprising result of some recent studies of the transformation is that private actors do not 
necessary require better institutions and public goods. On the contrary, they are interested in the 
persistence of the inefficient equilibrium. There are different explanations for this fact in economics 
and political science. 
•  Hellmann (1998) reveals that the first stage of the transformation with inefficient and 
incomplete market order and weak government creates transformation rents for some 
economic actors. The winners of this transformation are interested in a long-term 
institutional interregnum as a source for their rent income. 
•  Path dependence is also an important factor influencing the behavior of Russian companies 
and households. Many scholars refer to “long-term traditions of the centralized economy and 
corrupt governments” (e.g. Panther 1998) which created a kind of QWERTY effect, Russian 
managers are able to act only in a system of institutional interregnum. Their knowledge of   10
this generally inefficient system is a competition advantage for them which they want to 
use4. 
•  An important feature of the Russian economy is the domination of a small number of huge 
business groups. In 2002, 85% of the largest private Russian companies were under control 
of 6 groups of shareholders (Boone, Rodionov 2002). Large companies have different 
opportunities to protect their property. They can invest in a private protection system (e.g., 
hire a security firm) or use their “exit” option to influence the government’s behavior and to 
ensure a better public protection system. Under a deficit of public protection, rich agents 
can gain from redistribution due to improper protection of property rights, because they 
have a significant advantage over the weaker agents. Thus, they become “natural opponents 
in improvement in public protection” (Sonin 2002)5.  
Due to these three factors, we can assume that a better supply of institutions afford both 
advantages and disadvantages for Russian companies. In fact, the gains may even be smaller than 
the losses. Thus, companies do not generally use the “exit” option to improve institutional quality of 
the Russian economy. Mummert, Mummert (2000) describe a possible situation in a developing or 
transformation economy, in which the same interest groups transfer capital from the country 
because of the inefficiency of its economy but at the same time are interested in the persistence of 
the inefficient economy. We believe a similar situation exists in Russia.  
An interesting question from the normative point of view is to prove the existence of a 
“dumping strategy” option for the Russian government. Is it possible to lower taxation under the 
current low quality of institutions and still attract foreign investments? There is no clear theoretical 
and empirical support for this option, especially for large countries. However, even if this strategy is 
successful, bad institutions prevent capital from long-term investments in the Russian economy 
because of high uncertainty. For this reason, the positive effects can only be short-term.  
Paradoxically, the “exit” of efficient companies can even strengthen inefficient companies. 
After most efficient companies leave the country, the remaining inefficient ones become the main 
source of income for politicians and bureaucrats (legally and illegally). As such, they have a 
considerable impact on political decisions.  
It is more difficult to explain the behavior of foreign companies which make investment (or 
divestment) decisions. In section 3, we provided an overview of investment deficit of the present-
day Russian economy. However, there are companies investing even under these circumstances. 
 Many scientists hope that these companies can create a kind of “countervailing power” which is 
able to encourage the government to provide better institutions. Unfortunately the experience of 
some CIS countries does not justify these hopes. For example, Kazakhstan managed to attract the 
highest per-capita value of FDI in the CIS. The FDI share in tangible asset formation in Kazakhstan 
is 3 to 4 times as high as in Russia (see Figure 7).  
However, the quality of institutions in Kazakhstan remains as low as in Russia (or even lower). 
The grade of corruption is also very high (Transparency International 2004; Heritage Foundation 
2004). Hellmann, Jones and Kaufmann (2000, p.5) show that foreign companies are often engaged 
in corruption networks in host countries.  Even the privatization of assets started with different 
corruption scandals involving the participation of foreign investors (see Brill Olcott 2003). 
                                                           
4  However, there is a general problem associated with all path dependencies and cultural effects. As culture and history are specific 
for each country, it is very difficult to make generalized statements about their economic effects. The existing phenomena are 
declared to be the only possible. Another problem is the complexity of the historical processes and difficulties with the separation 
of different factors. 
5  Rajan, Zingales (2003) provide an example of this effect, comparing economic development in the US with a majority of small 
farmers in Latin America with big landowners.    11
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There are at least two explanations of this. First, inefficient and corrupt economies (as is the 
case is Russia and Kazakhstan) often attract inefficient investors, companies which are ready to 
work within corruption and criminal networks   
(Akhmetova 2002, p.62). This fact creates a kind of adverse selection. The governments receive 
foreign investments, even providing bad institutions and public goods. Second, huge natural 
resources can partly substitute for the inefficiency of institutions, especially if foreign investors are 




4.2  Supply Side of the Market for Institutions and Public Goods 
It is easier to explain the reasons the government has for providing law quality institutions and 
public goods. Actually, there are two main logics explaining the government behavior: the power 
logic and the income logic. The government tries to ensure its power position and to receive 
pecuniary gains from its position. The power logic is at the center of the political analysis of the 
relations between state and business; the income logic is a popular explanation of the government’s 
behavior in economics. 
From the point of view of the power logic, the government requires certain instruments of 
influence which can be used to control private actors and to prevent them from investing in the 
political opposition. A possible means to achieve this is through the bad specification of property 
rights. In case of a conflict, the government can easily enforce its will, using formally legal 
instruments (Furman 2003). The case of Yukos may perhaps be one of the best examples for this 
power instrument.    12
The income logic explains the behavior of public actors with the same instruments as those of 
private actors. Bureaucrats and politicians maximize their income, not the wealth of the nation. 
There are many options for rent seeking and rent creating in an economy with bad institutions: a 
huge number of governmental interventions and administrative barriers (like licenses, standards and 
a sophisticated registration system) and a lack of control over the government are one of the main 
reasons for the dominating corruption. 
Under realistic assumptions, however, all governments are interested in profit maximizing and 
income maximizing. That is the reason for interjurisdictional competition to create an additional 
control instrument over the government. That means that the power logic and the income logic do 
not explain the reasons for the failure of interjurisdictional competition. They only describe the 
behavior of the government. There are, however, two other factors influencing the supply side of 
the market for institutions in Russia. The first one is the political system which is characterized by a 
lack of democratic control over the political decisions.  
In a recent study, Popow (2003) demonstrates that countries with “bad democracies” 
(democratic regimes which fail to ensure the economic rights of their citizens) are even less 
efficient than autocratic regimes. In a democratic regime (even in the case of a bad democracy like 
Russia), economic policy is determined by both power and income logics. In an autocratic regime, 
the government does not need to ensure its power by changing economic institutions, because the 
main source of power is pure violence. As such, there are fewer reasons for the government to 
create bad institutions in an autocratic regime than in a bad democracy, and there are more 
possibilities for the government to create bad institutions in a bad democracy than in a good 
democracy. 
The second factor involves oil and gas export. First, under high prices on the international 
markets, it can soften the negative processes in the Russian economy. Second, it creates additional 
influence potential for the government in international relations. For this reason, the government 
does not necessarily need economic development to maximize its power in international relations. 
Both the government and private actors have certain reasons for encouraging bad institutions 
and for supporting bad institutions. This means an existence of an institutional trap (a stabile 
inefficient equilibrium) which prevents interjurisdictional competition from influencing the Russian 




5.  Conclusions 
Russian integration into the world economy requires its participation in global interjurisdictional 
competition. However, the competition position of Russia is rather bad than good because of the 
low “quality” of institutions and public goods and a relatively high (partly informal) “price” for 
them. This inefficiency leads to a deficit in foreign investments and a “brain drain” and capital 
flight as well. However, interjurisdictional competition does not execute its control function due to 
specific behavior of private and public actors. Both the supply side and the demand side support the 
existing inefficient equilibrium. 
The first conclusion is that the ongoing integration of Russia in the world economy is not 
sufficient to move its economic system to a better equilibrium. The “exit” option is useless if 
economic agents do not use it to enforce better institutions for the national economy, and the 
government does not depend upon the decisions of private actors due to specific features of political 
system. Integration can only be efficient if efficient political institutions are created and current 
sources of power in the private sector are weakened.    13
The second point we wish to make is that the main problem with the Russian economy is not the 
high price of goods and services offered by the government but the law quality of institutions, 
goods and services. The potential of pure tax reforms for attracting investors and preventing illegal 
practices as well as “exit” is limited. Additional institutional reforms for improving the quality of 
institutions and public goods are required.   14
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